China As a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth? by Dam, Kenneth W.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2006
China As a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential
for Economic Growth?
Kenneth W. Dam
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth W. Dam, "China As a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth?" ( John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 275, 2006).
  
 
CHICAGO  
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 275 
(2D SERIES) 
 
 
 
China As a Test Case: 
Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth? 
 
 
Kenneth  W. Dam 
 
 
THE  LAW  SCHOOL  
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  
 
January 2006 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
  http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=880125 
 
CHINA AS A TEST CASE 
Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth? 
 
Kenneth W. Damα 
Max Pam Professor Emeritus of American and Foreign Law 
and 
Senior Lecturer 
The University of Chicago Law School 
 
Senior Fellow 
The Brookings Institution 
 
 
China is the fastest growing country in the world. Moreover, its economy has 
already become one of the most important in the world. Many commentators predict that 
China will surpass the size of the U.S. economy some time in the second decade of this 
century (although it will, to be sure, still be at a much lower per capita income level). 
Though these predictions are for most purposes quite misleading,1 China’s prowess in 
manufacturing is already a challenge to the manufacturing sectors of the most advanced 
economies, at least in labor intensive industries. Moreover, China is going beyond low-
wage manufacturing and entering the high technology arena (from the top down, so to 
speak) through high-level research backed by a growing army of highly educated 
scientists and engineers completing graduate studies and through the outsourcing to 
China of research and development activities from some of the world’s most 
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Vichniac and Heather Milkewicz, his research assistants at Brookings.This working paper was written in 
preparation for a forthcoming book length study of the rule of law in economic development. 
1 The predictions of total Chinese GDP soon surpassing U.S. GDP are based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP) comparisons, which, whatever their value for certain purposes (see the discussion later in this paper), 
are almost surely unjustified for any inference about the weight of one country’s economy in the world 
economy for the purpose of predicting national security or foreign policy influence. Cooper (2004), for 
example, finds that under a market exchange rate comparison, China’s GDP in 2020 would still be only 24 
percent as large as U.S. GDP and significantly lower than Japanese GDP. See also Cooper (2002). Green 
(2003, p. 2) also points out that under present growth trends China’s GDP in 2025 would be $5 trillion, 
about 40 percent as large as the U.S. economy was in 2005. In October 2005 Hu Jintao stated at a G-20 
meeting that China “will try to increase its GDP up to around 4 trillion US dollars and per capita GDP to 
around $3,000 US in 15 years.” People’s Daily Online (Oct. 15, 2005). That Chinese GDP figure for 2020 
would still be equal to only about one-third of 2005 U.S. GDP and obviously a much smaller proportion of 
2005 U.S. per capita GDP. 
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accomplished high technology firms. 
Yet the level of China’s adherence to the Rule of Law is frequently criticized.2 
 
 How should one put together China’s growth rate with its Rule of Law profile? 
Does the coexistence of the two mean that, contrary to the now prevailing view, 
institutions are not important after all to economic growth? Should we conclude, at the 
very least, that legal institutions, and the Rule of Law in particular, are not important?3 
One group of scholars, Allen, Qian and Qian (“AQQ”), has reached more than half way 
to that conclusion: 
 
China is an important counterexample to the findings in the law, 
institutions, finance, and growth literature: Neither its legal nor financial 
system is well developed by existing standards, yet it has one of the fastest 
growing economies.4 
 
In arguing that China was a counterexample to the legal institutional approach, 
AQQ gave China scores on corporate and creditor rights law following the LLSV Law 
and Finance methodology developed by LaPorta and his colleagues in their Law and 
Finance article.5 In corporate law China was assigned by AQQ a shareholder rights score 
of 3 (out of 6) and a creditors rights score of 2 (out of 4). This result put China’s 
shareholder rights score below the English-origin average (4) but above the French-origin 
average (2.33). For creditors rights the AQQ score for China of 2 was below the English-
origin score (3.11), but above the French-origin score (1.58) (and, by the way, above the 
U.S., Canadian and Australian scores of a mere 1).6 (China’s creditor rights score is 
nonetheless far below many of its neighbors: Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia 
all scored a perfect 4.) In any case, if China had been in the LLSV list of countries, it 
would have ranked right at the average of all LLSV countries (developed and 
developing) for shareholder rights.7  
 
Though one might think that these comparisons leave China in a reasonably 
strong position, somewhere between the English-origin average and the French-origin 
                                                 
2 For a detailed and balanced, if optimistic, view of the Rule of Law in the Chinese context, see 
generally Peerenboom (2002).  
3 Peerenboom (2002, p. 462–463). 
4 AQQ (2005a, p. 57).  
5 AQQ (2005a); LaPorta (1998).  
6 AQQ scores are found at AQQ (2005a, p. 65, Table 2A and p. 66, Table 2B). The LLSV scores are 
found at LLSV (1998, p. 1130–1131, Table 2 and 1136–1137, Table 4).  
7 AQQ (2005a, p. 65, Table 2A and p. 66, Table 2B) and LLSV (1998, p. 1131, Table 2).  
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average, AQQ decided on a different comparison—a comparison based on the number of 
countries above and below a given sample mean. Abandoning LLSV averages, AQQ 
emphasized that “[a]lmost half of the countries in the French-origin subsample … have 
equal or better measures of creditor and shareholder rights” and that the “overall 
evidence … suggests that the majority of LLSV-sample countries have better creditor and 
shareholder protections than China.”8 Although China’s shareholder rights score of 3 
was exactly the same as the average scores of the 49 countries in the LLSV sample, AAQ 
chose to emphasize that 65 percent of the LLSV 49 countries had a score “higher or equal 
to three.”9  
 
Nonetheless, if one takes the LLSV analysis as giving a reliable insight into 
corporate and creditors rights law, the bottom line is surely that China’s substantive law 
is not hopelessly weak. Indeed, looking at the LLSV sorting of countries by per capita 
income, China would rank somewhere in the middle of the pack—slightly below the 
middle point of the mid 50 percent of countries for both shareholder and creditors 
rights.10 Nonetheless, the real question is how well the substantive law is enforced.11 
According to an OECD report, surveys show that “China is still seen as comparing 
unfavourably to its Asian competitors” with regard to “actual corporate governance 
practices.”12  
 
The Chinese Economy: Is a Slowdown in Growth Ahead? 
 
 The absolute size of the Chinese economy and the penchant among journalists 
and economic pundits for mechanical extrapolation into a distant future of current trends 
lead many a credulous reader and television viewer to believe that the Chinese economy 
is well on its way to developed country economic status. Nothing could be further from 
the truth! 
 
                                                 
8 AQQ (2005a, p. 64).  
9 AQQ (2005a, p. 66, Table 2B). AQQ (2005a) does not state what percentage of the LLSV 49 countries 
had a score “lower or equal” to three, a category obviously overlapping with “higher or equal.” 
10 See LLSV (1998). Pistor and Xu (2005, p. 191, Table 2) find China somewhat below average for 
“legal shareholder protection” both as a matter of formal law and regulatory quality among transition 
countries.  
11  AQQ (2005a) not only make the same point about enforcement but also attempt to measure 
enforcement in China. However, their measures taken from LLSV (1998) are mostly about issues that do 
not bear on judicial enforcement of substantive law—e.g., risk of expropriation, risk of contract 
repudiation, and accounting standards—or are much too general to measure judicial enforcement—e.g., 
corruption and rule of law. AQQ (2005a, p. 68, Table 2C). In any case, AQQ (2005a) does not attempt to 
rate China on most of their enforcement measures. 
12 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2002, p. 36).  
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 The Chinese economy is well down the list of developing countries in per capita 
income. In 2003 per capita income (according to official Chinese statistics) was $1,100 
(U.S.) at current exchange rates. Using purchasing power parity (PPP), per capita GDP 
was $5,003 in that year. For North American readers, it may be helpful to compare China 
with Mexico, since those readers will probably be at least somewhat aware of Mexican 
life, where one can encounter great wealth (often behind high walls) but also millions 
upon millions of impoverished citizens. At current exchange rates Mexican per capita 
income in 2003 was $6,230, well over five times as great as per capita income in China; 
and Mexico’s per capita income on a PPP basis was $9,168, almost twice as great as 
China’s.13  
 
One can argue about the right measure to use for comparisons—PPP or current 
exchange rates. PPP numbers reflect the buying power of a resident in the local economy 
at local prices, where money purchases of services and locally produced goods in poor 
countries are often at prices well below international levels calculated at market exchange 
rates. In a village in a developing country a local resident can acquire haircuts and the 
services of domestics at a tiny fraction of what they would cost in a highly developed 
country (compared at market exchange rates).  
 
In any event and even if one can trust Chinese economic statistics for GDP in 
Chinese currency, we have every reason to be skeptical of the PPP figures for Chinese 
GDP. Citing a number of technical but crucial defects in China’s collection of the 
requisite underlying information, a 1994 World Bank report stated that “[t]here is no 
reliable PPP estimate of China’s PPP.”14 The report further concluded that some PPP 
approximations probably overstated China’s PPP GDP per capita and that in any event 
those approximations varied at the time from $1,000 to $3,000.15 Albert Keidel, who 
prepared the World Bank report, recently reaffirmed the inadequacy of those 
approximations, stating: 
 
                                                 
13  World Development Indicators. Available at [http://devdata.worldbank.org/ dataonline/] (data in 
current international dollars). In December 2005 the Chinese government announced that its first 
nationwide economic census revealed that Chinese GDP in 2004 was actually 16.8 percent higher than 
previously announced, and that 93 percent of the increase was accounted for by a better estimate of the size 
of the services sector. Revised GDP for 2004 Up By 16.8%, China Daily (Dec. 21, 2005). See Giles 
(2005). 
14 World Bank (1994, p. v).  
15 World Bank (1994, p. v–vi). 
5 
China’s PPP is really unknown. We have no statistics on what the 
purchasing power parity measure of China’s GDP should be…. And so 
we’re looking at a Chinese economy that in PPP terms is much smaller, in 
my mind, than the numbers that are usually used.16 
 
Similarly, Richard Cooper argues: 
 
“Even if one were inclined to a purchasing power party (PPP) [measure], the PPP 
data that we have for China can only be described as flaky. That is to say, even if 
one preferred a PPP measure, we have a terrible time measuring an accurate PPP, 
and it is subject to all kinds of judgments by the analysts, not least the weights 
that one attaches to different components of output.”17 
 
Some critics do not trust Chinese statistics, saying such things as “I’m here to 
assure you that China will continue to publish 7 percent GDP, no matter what the 
industrial production numbers will show.”18 In any event, as Alwyn Young points out, 
China has used a different method than most countries for arriving at national GDP; it 
adds up local production reports to reach a national total, with predictable incentives for 
local overreporting when actual growth is weak and underreporting in periods of 
overheating in the economy.19 
 
 A further reason for being cautious about past Chinese GDP growth rates has 
been given by Young: even assuming the correctness of Chinese nominal national 
income statistics, inflation was underestimated by Chinese authorities so that real GDP 
growth in the 1986–1998 period was overstated by 3.0 per cent per annum.20 Using 
Young’s analysis, the real growth in GDP during that period was 6.2 percent rather than 
9.2 percent. Growth of over 6 percent is still, of course, an extraordinary achievement but 
would not lead to the kind of assumptions about the future that underpin so much 
contemporary discussion. Over 24 years, the compounding of 9 percent growth yields an 
eightfold increase in total growth whereas compounding of 6 percent growth would yield 
                                                 
16 Statement of Albert Keidel. In Transcript of an IMF Economic Forum, China In The Global Economy: 
Prospects and Challenges. Washington D.C. October 19, 2004. Available at  
[http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2004/tr041019.htm].  
17 Statement of Richard N. Cooper, Mauritis C. Boas Professor of Economics, Harvard University. In 
Compilation of Hearings Held Before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission. 107th Congress, First 
and Second Sessions. p. 788 (2002).  
18  Statement of Stephen Roach. In Transcript of an IMF Economic Forum, China In The Global 
Economy: Prospects and Challenges. Washington D.C. October 19, 2004. Available at  
[http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2004/tr041019.htm]. 
19 Young (2003, p. 1224 and n. 5). On the weaknesses of the Chinese statistical system, see Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005b, p. 169-196). 
20 Young (2003, p. 1232). See also World Bank (1997, p. 3, Box 1.1). 
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only a fourfold increase—resulting in a Chinese economy only half as much larger than 
the base year at 6 percent growth than it would be at 9 percent growth. 
 The policy question is not what the exact Chinese growth rate is today; whether 
that rate is in the 9 or 6 percent range, it is important to know whether the growth rate can 
be sustained. One reason for doubt derives from the recent history of China’s neighbors. 
The uncontroversial fact that China is presently at a much lower level of per capita GDP 
is key. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and several other neighbors grew at least as fast as 
China when their per capita GDP levels were at the present Chinese level. In that sense 
China is no outlier in East Asian growth statistics. 
 
 Martin Wolf, using data from Angus Maddison’s most recent work, summarizes 
the comparison with the growth rate of China: 
 
China’s gross domestic product per head at purchasing power parity rose 
by 370 per cent between 1978 and 2004, a trend rate of 6.1 percent a year. 
Yet between 1950 and 1973, Japan’s GDP per head had increased by 460 
percent, a trend rate of 8.2 percent. Between 1962 and 1990, South 
Korea’s GDP per head rose by 680 per cent, a trend rate of 7.6 percent, 
while Taiwan’s rose by 600 percent, between 1958 and 1987, a trend rate 
of 7.1 percent.21 
 
The important point about the comparison with China’s neighbors is that the 
spurts of growth Wolf refers to (lasting from 23 years for Japan to 29 years for Taiwan) 
are comparable to the period between the announcement by the Chinese Communist 
Party (“CCP”) under the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 that its focus would 
shift to economic development and the first decade of the twenty-first century. And 
shortly after the end of their surge of growth, most of the neighbors experienced a 
substantial slowdown in growth. In the case of Japan, the economic downturn was longer 
even though Japan’s Rule of Law record is stronger than the other neighbors.  
 
 The slowdown among China’s neighbors such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and South Korea was quite pronounced. A careful study using data up to mid-2001 found 
that the loss from the slowdown beginning in 1997 was never made up and hence the 
result was a permanent loss in cumulative GDP.22 Data for later years shows, moreover, 
that the growth rate continued, after the turn of the millennium, to be substantially below 
                                                 
21 Wolf (2005).  
22 Cerra and Saxena (2005).  
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that of the period leading up to 1997. And this was true despite the fact that in 2004, The 
Economist noted that the world economy had been “growing at its fastest rate for almost 
30 years.”23 
  
 Thailand grew at rates between 6.8 and 11.2 percent from 1990 to 1996, with 
1997 marking the beginning of a recession, but managed only 4.8 percent average growth 
between 2000 and 2003. Indonesia grew at rates between 7.2 and 9.0 percent between 
1990 and 1996, but averaged only 4.1 percent average growth from 2000 to 2003. And 
Malaysia, which some pundits claimed did not suffer much from the Asian financial 
crisis because it fenced off its financial sector with capital controls, nevertheless was 
unable to replicate its 8.9 to 10.0 percent growth of the 1990-1996 period, achieving only 
an average of 4.7 percent during the 2000-2003 period.24  
 
 The reasons for this marked slowdown, especially after the recession, among 
China’s neighbors are controversial and multiple. One reason is of course that as a 
country reaches a GDP per capita level closer to that of the developed world, the 
opportunities for “catch-up” with first world technology and business methods become 
more difficult and expensive to realize. This was particularly the case of Japan, which 
reached West European levels several decades ago. Moreover, some of the slowdown 
was perhaps the result of economic policy errors. It is certainly true that the region was 
affected during the rest of the 1990s by the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, which might 
have been avoided or lessened by different economic policies. Some analysts attribute the 
Asian financial crisis, for example, to purely macroeconomic factors. 
 
A strong case—indeed, a surprisingly strong case—can be made that the trigger 
for the Asian financial crisis (which some analysts blame for the subsequent slowdown) 
was a series of institutional failings. These failings were particularly striking in the 
financial sector—poor corporate governance, directed and related lending, and the 
absence of effective bankruptcy laws,25 as well as a perceived  implicit government 
guarantee to banks26 and poor banking supervision facilitating “crony capitalism.”27 An 
important study by Simon Johnson and colleagues showed that although poor 
                                                 
23 Dancing in Step. The Economist (U.S. Edition, November 11, 2004). 
24 World Development Indicators. Available at [http://devdata.worldbank.org/ dataonline/]. 
25 For a journalistic review of corporate governance failings and abuse of minority shareholders leading 
to the Asian financial crisis, see Vines (2000, p. 141–160). See also Six Deadly Sins. The Economist (U.S. 
Edition, March 5, 1998); On the Rocks. The Economist (U.S. Edition, March 5, 1998). 
26 Bai and Wang (1999, p. 436–437); Krugman (1998).  
27 Pomerleano (1999).  
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macroeconomic management may have triggered the Asian financial crisis, the extent of 
exchange rate depreciation and of stock market declines among the Asian crisis countries 
was closely related to their respective weaknesses in legal institutions regarding 
corporate governance, particularly lack of protection for minority shareholders. 28  A 
statistical study found, with respect to Thailand and Indonesia (the two countries perhaps 
worst hit by the Asian crisis), significant results suggesting a high degree of 
expropriation of minority shareholders.29  
 
In Indonesia much of the banking system proved to be insolvent, in large part due 
to connected and directed lending: 
 
The main cause of private banks’ nonperforming loans was connected 
lending, with these banks being used to channel credits to bank owners. In 
the case of state-owned banks, the main cause was state-directed 
lending.30 
 
According to The Economist, crony capitalism was remarkably blatant in 
Indonesia during the Suharto period:  
 
President Suharto’s family dominates the economy, owning huge chunks 
of business, including power generation, an airline, construction, 
telecoms, toll roads, newspapers, property and cars. Family members and 
their cronies get first pick of government contracts and licenses, so it helps 
to have one of their names on the company letterhead. Paying off family 
members or well-connected officials can add up to 30% to the cost of a 
deal.31 
 
In the case of Japan, it is now apparent that its inability to resume consistent 
growth has been partly tied up with its weak banking sector, which in turn was related to 
the insistence of the government, and especially the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, that 
Japanese banks support sectors and regions important to the government of the day.  
Lending by banks quickly turned into several decades of nonperforming loans that 
continue to some extent today.  
 
The question for the future, therefore, is whether China can avoid the slowdown 
                                                 
28 See Johnson et al. (2000) and Claessens et al. (2000) on the shareholding structure that made minority 
shareholders vulnerable. 
29 Claessens et al. (1999).  
30 Srinivas and Sitorus (2004, p. 153–155).  
31 Six Deadly Sins. The Economist (U.S. Edition, March 5, 1998). 
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experienced by its neighbors. Will its institutional weaknesses, especially in the financial 
sector, endanger continued Chinese growth rates just as similar weaknesses reduced the 
growth rates of its Asian neighbors? The World Bank Country Director for China 
recently laid out the risks: 
 
While China has grown well since 1990, it is remarkable how much 
savings and investment this has required…. On the one hand, the need for 
such a large amount of investment for China’s level of growth reflects the 
inefficiency of the financial system and the preference of local 
governments for large amounts of investment. A lot of bad investments are 
financed which ultimately produce little value. This is wasteful for China 
in real terms, and also creates the financial sector problem of a large 
volume of non-performing loans. This situation creates a systemic risk for 
China, in which some kind of internal or external shock could set off a 
costly financial crisis.  
 
It also seems clear that this pattern of growth cannot be sustained 
indefinitely. Investment cannot just keep rising as a share of GDP and it 
will be increasingly difficult for China to keep increasing its share of 
world trade at the same rate.32 
 
In short, according to this line of analysis, the weak and inefficient financial sector will 
either lead to a crisis similar to the Asian financial crisis or to a less rapidly growing 
China. Either way, a weak financial sector is likely to create a slowdown in growth.33 
 
A Closer Look at the Chinese Growth Record 
 
  Before looking more closely at China’s Rule of Law weaknesses, it is worth 
examining the nature of Chinese growth in recent decades and comparing it with the 
growth of China’s neighbors during their period of rapid growth. An understanding of 
China’s growth, in comparison to that of other Asian countries, can be gained by using 
the tools of a branch of modern economics known as growth accounting. This approach 
involves breaking down the sources of growth into capital and labor inputs. Both of these 
inputs can be adjusted for quality—labor, for example, can be adjusted for the levels of 
growth in human capital (represented, say, by increasing years of education of the labor 
                                                 
32 David Dollar. Improving the Efficiency of China’s Growth Is Important for the Whole World. Slides 
available at [http://www.cgdev.org/docs/DDollarslides.pdf] (undated but presented in June 2005). 
33 This analysis involves a short-term slowdown in Chinese per capita growth. Over the longer term a 
slowdown in the growth of total GDP seems inevitable due to the demographic structure of China, created 
in large part by the one-child policy. China’s population profile is aging more rapidly than most other 
Asian countries, notably India. 
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force). The residual of the overall growth, which is that portion that cannot be explained 
by adjusted capital and labor inputs, is usually called Total Factor Productivity (“TFP”) 
and is usually taken as a measure of the portion of growth attributable to added efficiency 
from, say, innovation. TFP “represents the proportional increase in output that would 
have occurred in the absence of any input changes.”34 
 
The enthusiasm about future growth now so apparent in the case of China was 
widespread with regard to China’s Asian neighbors in the early 1990s. A highly popular 
1997 book titled Megatrends Asia carried the excitement right up to the 1997 Asia 
financial crisis, celebrating “Asia’s rapid ascent to global economic dominance.” 35 
Against that romance of unlimited growth, however, a 1994 article in Foreign Affairs by 
Paul Krugman turned out to be prescient; using already published growth accounting 
research, he showed why the tendency to extrapolate current growth mechanically into 
the future was the economic equivalent of driving by looking in a rear view mirror.36  
 
Krugman’s key point was that the growth of the so-called Asian Tigers (also 
called the Asian NIEs—newly industrialized countries) had been based on increasing 
capital and labor inputs—particularly labor inputs—and that TFP (which would refer to 
increasing efficiencies, including catching up with advanced country technologies and 
management techniques) had made little or no contribution to the Asian Tigers growth 
rates. 37  Relying in part on an article by Alwyn Young, Krugman pointed out that 
Singapore’s growth between 1990 and 1996 (per capita income doubling every decade) 
could be explained by the increase in the share of the population employed from 27 to 51 
percent and by an investment rate of 40 percent. He further argued—the critical point—
that there was no sign of increased efficiency (that is, no increase in TFP). Since 
Singapore could not be expected once again to nearly double the proportion of its 
population employed (given that 51 percent were already employed) and since an 
investment rate much above 40 percent was difficult to imagine, it was obvious that 
Singapore’s growth rate would have to slow down. 
 
Krugman analogized the success of Singapore to the success of the Soviet Union 
in its early years of rapid growth through an “astonishing mobilization of resources”: 
                                                 
34 Young (2003, p. 1223).  
35 Naisbitt (1997, p. 14).  
36 Krugman (1994).  
37 See summary of studies with regard to other rapidly growing Asian countries in Rodrik (1996) and 
Felipe (1997, Appendix).  
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“Asian growth, like that of the Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seems to be driven by 
extraordinary growth in inputs like labor and capital rather than by gains in efficiency.”38 
What is particularly interesting about the Krugman article, and the research by growth 
economists on whom he relied, is that the predicated slowdown in the Asian Tigers 
became manifest within only a few years. Although some have blamed the slowdown on 
the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the fact is that once the bulk of the labor force 
was gainfully employed in modern industrial and service industries, there was no longer 
much additional labor to be usefully deployed in increasing the growth rate.  
 
Can such a slowdown be expected in Chinese growth? Alwyn Young, one of the 
economists on whose work Krugman based his article, has more recently gone deeply 
into Chinese statistics to determine whether Chinese growth is also explained by China’s 
ability to mobilize labor resources and by China’s high rate of investment.39 He noted 
that, in the context of increased labor force participation rates and disproportionately 
large increases in the working age population, a movement in the proportion of the 
population employed in agricultural labor relative to nonagricultural labor had taken 
place. While the agricultural labor force had hardly grown (less than one percent per 
annum from 1978 to 1988), the nonagricultural labor force grew rapidly: 4.5 percent per 
annum.40 In a lengthy complex analysis that cannot be adequately summarized in a few 
sentences, he concluded that the disproportionate increase in the nonagricultural labor 
force coupled with its increased educational attainment and the increased labor force 
participation accounted for most of the well-publicized high growth rate. (Put in 
laymen’s terms, Young was analyzing the economic result of the shift in the relative 
proportion of Chinese workers from farm to factory and from the rural West to the more 
dynamic eastern and southern coastal areas.)  
 
The Young analysis has two important implications for Rule of Law issues. First, 
China is growing, but its growth is much like that of the Asian Tigers and therefore at 
some point one should expect a slowdown. However, with tens of millions of 
unemployed and underutilized labor, especially in rural Western China,41 the period 
before slowdown may well be longer. Further, there have apparently been large numbers 
of underutilized workers in China’s State Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”) and tens of 
                                                 
38 Krugman (1994, p. 70).  
39 Young (2003).  
40 Young (2003, p. 1235, Table 6 and p. 1237, Table 8). 
41 Wu (2005, p. 133-138). 
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millions have been laid off—11.5 million in 1997 alone.42 On the other hand, China has 
a rapidly aging labor force due to its one-child policy and therefore there is not a massive 
army of young adults (relative to its 1.3 billion population) ready to join the labor force. 
In fact, China’s population is one of the oldest on average in Asia.43 
 
Second, Young found that China had experienced growth in TFP, though his 
estimate of TFP growth was lower than that found by others, who using different periods 
have found different results. Bosworth and Collins found that TFP growth in China was 
higher than the rest of East Asia as a whole and the developing world as a whole.44 
Improvement in institutional quality appears in growth accounting exercises under the 
TFP account, and although China’s absolute level of institutional quality may still be 
low, it is now growing faster than during the Cultural Revolution.  
 
Heystens and Zebregs, surveying the literature, found that Chinese “TFP growth 
was … particularly high following the liberalization of the agricultural sector in the early 
1980s, and in the early 1990s after market-oriented reforms were accelerated, and to have 
been well above that of the prereform period (1952–78).”45 Hence, even when capital 
and labor resources are plentiful, growth appears to be dependent on TFP growth, and 
institutional reform has fed TFP growth in China in the past. An OECD study found that 
the growing private sector in China had a higher TFP than the state-owned sector; and 
this was true even though the state sector had higher labor productivity due to the fact 
that the state sector was able to apply three times the capital that was utilized by the 
private sector (which, as shown below, has little access to bank lending or the corporate 
bond market in the present stage of Chinese institutional reform).46 Whether China can 
avoid a growth slowdown therefore depends in substantial measure, as the experience of 
China’s Asian neighbors suggests, on whether it can successfully address institutional 
issues, including Rule of Law issues. 
 
Enforcement and the Chinese Judiciary 
 
  The Chinese government and society have been placing increasing importance on 
                                                 
42 See Qian (2000a). See also Wu (2005, p. 198). 
43 “At the outset of reform in the late 1970s, over 70 percent of China’s labor force was employed in 
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which is impossible without successful development outside the agricultural sector.” Qian (2003, p. 301).  
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13 
law: 
Judicial caseloads are averaging nearly 5 million per year nationwide, 
while the number of additional disputes resolved through mediation and 
arbitration is burgeoning. Bookstores in Beijing, Shanghai, and other 
major cities are well stocked with books on law, and crowded with 
prospective purchasers. Law faculties are filled to capacity with many of 
China’s best students, driven by the prospect of lucrative employment to 
study a field that for all intents and purposes did not exist 25 years ago. 
Law firms have multiplied—more than 5,000 have been established since 
1990, bringing the total to more than 9,000.47 
 
An interest in, and even an emphasis on law, does not, however, mean that enforcement 
is of high quality. To address that issue, it is useful to break the issue down into two 
parts: the relationship of the state to the actors in the economy and the quality of the 
judiciary. 
 
  Despite the explosion in the size of the Chinese private sector, the remaining size 
of the state-owned and collective enterprise sectors, coupled with the influence of the 
government, the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”), and those allied with government 
and the party suggest that the central issues are likely to involve the problem of the 
predatory ruler. In China the potential problem is much greater than a sixteenth or 
seventeenth century Tudor or Stuart King seizing property or welshing on his debts; as 
powerful as the Crown might have been, most of England was untouched by what was a 
tiny government and public sector.48 In China the issues arise from the large role of 
government and the influence of the CCP. 
 
 As for the role and quality of the Chinese judiciary and, more broadly, the legal 
system as a whole, a few striking aspects of Chinese history play an important role. China 
had essentially no legal system when the economic reforms began in 1978. With the 
creation in 1949 of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 (“PRC”), even the notion of 
law was in flux and with the onset of the Cultural Revolution under Mao’s leadership, 
law was subordinated to party policies.49 As Clarke points out, a “legal vacuum” was 
created that “ultimately had to be filled by whatever authoritative materials 
decisionmakers had at hand, including Party newspaper editorials, policy documents, and 
                                                 
47 Potter (2004, p. 466).  
48 See discussion of the conflicts involving the Crown in England in Kenneth W. Dam, Institutions, 
History, and Economic Development, U. Chicago Law and Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 271, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875026. 
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leaders’ speeches.”50  
 
Even during the Imperial period (ending in 1911) the legal system was largely a 
penal system, and (though a good deal of academic controversy exists on the point51) the 
use of law to settle private disputes was less common than in other countries.52 Chow 
summarizes the traditional view of Imperial law on this subject: 
 
Citizens viewed law as being administered vertically, from the state upon 
the individual, as opposed to being used horizontally to resolve disputes 
between actors with one another…. [T]he use of law as a form of state 
administered power upon individuals also struck fear in most of the 
general population with good reason. Ordinary subjects who had disputes 
resolved them through informal means and mediation by various 
customary and unofficial channels such as through the use of craft or 
merchant guilds or through the intervention of village elders. The aversion 
to using the legal system among the general populace meant that China 
did not develop a civil law system useful in resolving civil disputes. 
Formal law only served the public interests of the state and was not 
viewed by ordinary Chinese as a tool to resolve private disputes.53 
 
It is, nonetheless, the case that in 1904, near the end of the Imperial period, a company 
law was passed, but it had few favorable economic consequences and, in any event, did 
not provide for private dispute settlement.54 
 
 In the first half of the Republic of China period (which ran from the end of the 
Empire in 1911 to the creation of the PRC in 1949), various attempts to introduce 
statutory law to govern disputes between private parties were made. But the technique of 
using legal transplants from Western systems did not find fertile soil, and private disputes 
continued to be dealt with primarily through customary mediation techniques.55 Perhaps 
one reason that the transplants did not take root is that China, never having been a 
colony, did no have a foreign legal system as a base of departure.56 Indeed, the idea of a 
court had been foreign to Chinese Imperial law, which had “no special, differentiated 
                                                 
50 Clarke (2005).  
51 Diamant et al. (2005, p. 4); Scoggins (1990).  
52 For a general discussion on the Rule of Law during the Imperial period, see Peerenboom (2002, p. 36–
43). 
53 Chow (2003, p. 52–53). Between the Imperial and Mao periods attempts were made to adopt Western-
type codes but these codes “had little effect on Chinese life, especially outside the cities,” in part because 
the codes “were often too complex and irrelevant to Chinese conditions and were adopted and studied in an 
abstract and mechanical spirit.” Lubman (1999, p. 31).  
54 Wei (2003, p. 27–29).  
55 Lubman (1999, p. 31–32). 
56 Clarke (2005).  
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institution (‘court’) before which disputing parties advance legal claims.”57 In any event, 
legal reform efforts were cut short by civil war. And Western laws and institutions 
evaporated with the 1949 creation of the PRC. 
 
 Beginning in 1978, with the ascent to Communist Party leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping, a legal reform effort was launched. Its purpose was an announced shift “from 
class struggle and political campaigns to economic development and modernization.”58 
The 1982 Constitution struck a Rule of Law theme by stating that the Constitution “is the 
fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority…. No organization or 
individual is privileged to be beyond the Constitution or the law.”59 And that theme was 
generalized in the 1999 amendments to the Constitution calling for the country to “be 
built into a socialist country based upon the rule of law.”60 In 2004 the Constitution was 
further amended to protect property; the amendment stated that “citizens’ lawful private 
property is inviolable,” that the “State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of 
citizens to private property and to its inheritance,” and that the State “shall make 
compensation for the private property expropriated or requisitioned.”61 
 
 If enforcement even more than substantive law is the key to the Rule of Law, then 
the first place to focus is on the Chinese judiciary. No power of judicial review with 
regard to the constitutionality of statutes exists. Moreover, there is little evidence that the 
Constitution has any direct effect at all in litigation; legislation determines the law and 
the legislature is thus sovereign (the role of the Party aside).62 One can object that British 
courts have no power of judicial review either. But of course the British have no single 
written document known as a constitution (and Chinese judges occupy a completely 
different role and societal position than British judges do). 
 
 Even more important than the absence of judicial review is the fact that there is 
little pretense that the Chinese judiciary is independent in the Western sense. One 
Chinese view of independence is that it is the judiciary as a whole that is to be 
independent, not the individual judge.63 Hence, judges may and often do consult with 
other judges, especially higher level judges, in reaching decisions—just as a bureaucrat 
                                                 
57 Clarke (2005). 
58 Chow (2003, p. 75).     
59 Quoted in Chow (2003, p. 77–78). 
60 Quoted in Chow (2003, p. 78). 
61 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, as amended in 2004, Article 13. 
62 Lin (2003, p. 275–276) and Gewirtz (2001, p. 208).  
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would naturally consult with superiors before reaching important decisions. 64  This 
practice reflects a bureaucratic culture pervading the Chinese judicial system.  
 
Bureaucratic consultation leads to unusual judicial practices. Higher courts 
sometimes act on their own initiative, without hearing parties or counsel, to instruct 
lower courts how to decide cases. 65  Another bureaucratic practice is the use of 
adjudicative committees,66 which sometimes discuss cases before trial, leading to the 
assertion that “those who try the case do not decide it, and those who decide the case do 
not try it.”67 The bureaucratic culture results in a situation, according to the President of 
the highest Chinese court, where “courts have often been taken as branches of the 
government, and judges viewed as civil servants who have to follow orders from 
superiors, which prevents them from exercising mandated legal duties.”68  The 2005 
Supreme People’s Court Five Year Plan for court reform called attention to the need for 
reform of adjudication committees, but the nature of that reform remained under 
consideration.69 
 
 Corresponding to the lack of judicial independence is the absence of any doctrine 
of separation of powers: 
 
The PRC also rejects the notion of horizontal separation of powers 
between different branches of the government (for example, the traditional 
troika of legislative, executive, and judicial branches). A necessary 
separation of functions is acknowledged, but constitutionally speaking the 
National People’s Congress (in form, a legislature) sits at the apex of 
China’s political power structure. In reality, that position is occupied by 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, 
but both form and reality share the rejection of multiple power centers.70 
 
 The fact that judges are regarded as bureaucrats leads to unusual consequences 
when the litigation involves the government. Some government offices of equal or higher 
bureaucratic rank than that of a judge see no reason to consider themselves bound by that 
judge’s orders; on the contrary, government officeholders tend to consider themselves 
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66 Peerenboom (2002, p. 323–325). 
67 Quoted in Lubman (1999, p. 261). 
68 Quoted in Hung (2004, p. 52). 
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bound only by orders issued by their superiors.71 And judgments can be reopened long 
after they are rendered, just as a government bureaucracy can always change its mind; in 
short, the concept of finality plays much less of a role than in most Western systems.72  
 
The interaction between the courts and the government bureaucracies is also 
affected by “local protectionism.”73 Federalism has been carried, especially on a de facto 
basis, much further in China than in most countries. As will be discussed below, this has 
beneficial aspects, but it is not an unmitigated blessing where the legal system is 
concerned given that the court system is supposedly national. Trial courts and judges are 
heavily dependent on local governments (and local people’s congresses) for funding, 
salaries, and even continued employment. Courts are thus often unsympathetic with 
plaintiffs from other provinces, especially where the defendant is a locally based state-
owned enterprise. 74  Civil judgments rendered in other provinces are often refused 
enforcement.75 
 
Perhaps the largest question of judicial independence involves the role of the 
CCP.76 Interference by Party members is probably more common in administrative rather 
than judicial bodies. Although judicial review of abstract rule-making by administrative 
bodies for compliance with the constitution and with legislation is not available, judicial 
review of administrative decisions to determine whether legislation has been complied 
with in particular cases involving particular parties (sometimes called legality review) is 
in principle available. But it is generally conceded that judicial control of administrative 
decisions leaves a good deal to be desired.77 
 
The early practice under which courts would ask for instructions from the Party’s 
political-legal committee at the court’s level has become less common, except perhaps in 
exceptional cases involving politically sensitive or controversial litigation.78 Because the 
role of the Party is not set out clearly in law, the techniques of interference take many 
forms. Hung recounts that in the period 1989-2000 a basic court in Jiangxi province 
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handled 200 first-instance administrative cases but the administrative defendants simply 
failed to appear in 95 percent of the cases.79 Hung also states that lawyers are reluctant to 
take cases challenging administrative acts for fear of losing their license to practice law.80 
She observes that the Party tries to propagate the notion that judges should rely on Party 
leadership in administrative litigation, pointing to an article published on the official web 
site of Chinese courts: 
 
The handling of many [administrative] cases involves the overall working 
situation of the party and the state and involves social stability and 
economic development [and] therefore, [judges] must tightly rely on the 
party committee’s leadership … to ensure the orderly development of 
administrative litigations….”81 
 
She also notes that courts even “boast in their annual reports about their efforts in ‘taking 
the initiative’ to get support from the party” in connection with administrative cases.82 
Hung also notes other kinds of interference by administrative bodies, such as harassing 
witnesses, pressuring plaintiffs to withdraw cases, and ex parte approaches to judges to 
“inquire” about cases and to “exchange” views, something which may be initiated by 
both administrative and Party officials.83  
 
 In 2004 the President of the Supreme People’s Court conceded that the “difficulty 
of executing civil and commercial judgments has become a major ‘chronic ailment’ often 
leading to chaos in the enforcement process.”84 According to his statement, “China’s 
courts lack the authority and stature to command obedience to their decisions, especially 
where such decisions affect other government branches and officials.”85 
 
Lawyers from common law countries, where judges often make law, should 
perhaps be reminded that the influence of the Party in legislation has traditionally been so 
dominant that the Party can simply change legislation to achieve its ends. The National 
People’s Congress, which is the legislature, and its Standing Committee “have generally 
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been viewed as docile, rubber-stamp bodies that routinely approve by unanimous or near 
unanimous vote legislation already approved by the [Party].”86 Hence, direct influence 
on courts is not always essential in order to shape the way the law develops; influence 
does become important, however, in actual enforcement of the law.  
 
The Party’s influence on enforcement can thus take various forms. Where 
adjudication committees are used, for example, they “usually make their decisions after 
consultation with the CCPs political-legal committees at corresponding levels.” 87  In 
addition, Party influence is partly exercised through the power of local people’s 
congresses over judicial budgets, salaries and tenure. Moreover, as Alford reports, 
“virtually all significant legal personnel are Party members or have been closely vetted 
by the Party prior to assuming office [and] this is particularly the case with regard to the 
judiciary.”88 Judges, especially at the trial level, are thus not necessarily behaviorally 
independent, especially because they frequently lack the education and competence 
necessary to command societal prestige89 and because administrative officials (who are 
often Party members) tend to lack respect for legal knowledge and law.90 
 
Moreover, Party influence can be said to be partly structural because of the 
particular type of federalism in China where the trial-level judiciary is not in practice 
shielded by the prestige of higher-level appellate courts; trial courts in that sense, not 
having independence and not benefiting from a notion of separation of powers, are forced 
to show some deference to local government and hence to the Party: 
 
Bifurcation between a people’s congress on the one hand and a day-to-day 
government on the other hand is replicated several layers down into local 
government. In each case, the government organization is responsible not 
to the government organization the next level up, but rather to the people’s 
congress at the same level. Again this is the formal structure. In practice, 
the Communist Party organization at any given level of government has a 
monopoly on political power. This monopoly, of course, does not mean 
absolute power to do whatever the Party organization wishes. There are 
always constraints on capacity, whether economic, political, or social.91 
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Efforts to meet this structural problem by creation of intermediate appellate courts with 
jurisdiction over more than one province have failed; hence, China has no equivalent of 
U.S. Courts of Appeal that normally have federal trial courts located in several U.S. 
states within their territorial jurisdiction.92 
 
Behavioral independence depends heavily on the tenure of judges and their 
salaries. A version of life tenure on good behavior was introduced by a 2001 amendment 
to the Judge’s Law; it limits the grounds for dismissal, but those grounds involve such 
broad criteria as “to be unqualified for the present post and decline to accept other 
assignments.”93 Also, the appointment and removal of chief judges of particular courts 
can be made by the corresponding legislative body.94 Judicial salaries are comparatively 
low. Judges’ education and training leave much to be desired,95 though the educational 
attainment of Chinese judges is improving; in 2003 some 40 percent had earned a four-
year university degree, a 21 per increase since 1998. 96  Corruption appears to be 
common.97 Finally, a 1998 rule issued by the highest court made judges subject to being 
held liable for intentional or negligent violation of any law or regulation; some 2000 
judges were held to have violated the rule in the 1999–2000 period and the consequences 
of violation were potentially substantial.98 Behavioral independence is thus questionable, 
despite the limitations on dismissal in the Judges Law. This is probably a problem largely 
in the review of administrative acts, where the interests of both the Party and the 
bureaucracy are more likely to be directly engaged than in ordinary civil litigation.  
 
Substantive Law 
 
Although enforcement may be as important as substantive law, poor enforcement 
is more likely to be a hindrance to growth than weak substantive law in developing 
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countries, Chinese officials have begun to recognize publicly that the substantive legal 
system presents a major risk to the Chinese financial system.99 
 
China faced a particular challenge during the Deng Xiaoping reform era at the end 
of the Cultural revolution. All property having a function in the economic system 
belonged to the state. Agricultural land belonged directly to the state. Non-agricultural 
economic activities, especially in industry, were carried on within companies, but these 
companies were not legal persons but rather were more like units of the government, 
often local government. State-owned corporations (“SOEs”) in the sense of legal persons 
with the legal qualities of Western corporations did not yet exist.100 In fact, the transfer 
of such activities from the earlier companies to distinct legal entities with shares owned 
by the state—a process sometimes called corporatization—was considered at the time a 
major reform.101 The separation of management from control was considered a step 
forward because it made possible, at least in theory, professional management that could 
be responsive to economic considerations rather than bureaucratic whim or fashion. 
However, the executives of state enterprises were still bureaucrats at heart, even to the 
extent of retaining their rank as state or provincial officials.102 
 
The enactment of a company law made the corporate form (and hence limited 
liability) also available to private enterprises and led in time to a decline in the market 
share of “SOEs.”103 In any event, the move to SOEs was far from a solution and did not 
give China a market economy. An SOE was still prone to bureaucratic interference. The 
ultimate owner—the Chinese people—could not act as an ultimate owner, exercising 
residual control rights; in fact, even if one is prepared to say that the state is the agent of 
the people with respect to governance of an SOE, the state itself was not able to fulfill 
that function.104 Legislation in 2003, however, created a State Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) to monitor and supervise central government 
controlled SOEs. 105  Parallel institutions were formed at provincial and local levels. 
Despite this legislation intended to concentrate the state’s ownership responsibilities, 
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SOEs may nonetheless remain subject to conflicting demands and preferences, 
particularly of local Party and local government officials. And the Party often appoints 
the managers.106  
 
These problems are particularly acute in the financial sector where government 
allocations of capital to enterprises were replaced in the 1980s by loans from four state-
owned commercial banks (SCBs).107 These SCBs tended to use government and Party 
criteria to allocate loans,108 and at the very least were sensitive to government and Party 
priorities for the promotion of particular industries and regions.109 Local bank branches 
were likely to be heavily influenced by local governments in making their credit 
allocation decisions. As a result of these pressures as much as 90 percent of SCB loans 
went to SOEs. 110  The SCBs were further handicapped in pursuing purely market 
considerations in lending decisions by what the Financial Times editorially called “large-
scale fraud, embezzlement and other misdeeds, from branch offices all the way up to the 
boardroom.”111 
 
  Given the role of the government and the Party, it is little wonder that SOEs 
acted, initially at least, more like government agencies than true private sector enterprises 
and even after various reforms, the state-dominated financial system did not produce 
satisfactory mobility of capital across China. Even to the extent capital was mobile, there 
was a tendency “to allocate capital systematically away from the more productive regions 
towards less productive ones.”112 For one reason, the SCBs concentrated on funding 
SOEs.113  
         
Meanwhile, the four large SCBs were supplemented by other state-owned 
financial institutions such as joint-stock banks (“JSBs”). 114  Unlike the original four 
SCBs, whose operations reflected the national perspective of their origin in a central 
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planning period, the 11 JSBs have been more focused on the business of banking.115 In 
addition, some 1000 or more “city” banks owned by municipalities have emerged. Still 
other publicly owned banks have been created for agricultural and non-business 
purposes.116 Only in 1995 was the first private sector bank licensed, and the few private 
banks in operation have a tiny percentage of the commercial-industrial market.117 Most 
state-owned financial institutions continue to focus their lending on keeping afloat SOEs, 
many of which are in parlous financial conditions: 
 
Bank loans appear to have been channeled to provinces with heavy 
concentrations of SOEs. These provinces have, at the same time, also been 
the ones that have tended to grow relatively slowly, suggesting that the 
productivity of lending was relatively low…. The banking system has 
been used to keep inefficient state enterprises afloat so as not to produce 
excessive layoffs and raise the cost of transition to levels where social 
stability might be threatened.118 
 
The result of the dominance of state banks compared to private banks is that the 
private commercial and industrial sector in China has had relatively little access to formal 
credit.119 Private sector enterprises, which outperform public sector enterprises,120 are 
financed almost entirely by retained earnings and private savings, although informal 
credit markets do exist: 
 
Between 1990 and 1997, the new jobs created in the private sector 
accounted for 56 percent of new formal employment in urban areas. This 
rapid growth has occurred with relatively few resources from the financial 
sector: in the period 1991–97, the share of private investment in the 
national total was in the range of 15–27 percent, with little recourse to 
formal bank loans (less than 1 percent of working capital loans went to the 
private sector).121  
 
Foreign direct investment has been a supplementary source of capital for private 
sector enterprises.122 Moreover, China has increasingly turned to foreign investment to 
stimulate reform in state-owned enterprises. Recently the Chinese government has 
encouraged minority investment (so-called strategic investment) by foreign banks in 
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state-owned banks. The rationale for this foreign investment reflects the Chinese 
economic leadership’s frustration with state-owned commercial banks. As explained by 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission: 
 
It should be recognized that transforming the Chinese state-owned commercial 
banks into real commercial ones would be an arduous task….Such an ownership 
structure makes it easy for banks to depart from market principles, but difficult 
for them to set up a sound corporate governance structure or an efficient operation 
mechanism. Consequently, it makes it hard for the banking supervisor to 
implement scientific and sound standards, resulting in both the high and 
accumulating impaired assets and low business performance. Such circumstances 
could not only block the banks from achieving sustainable development, but also 
have a direct impact on the control and mitigation of risks as well as the efficient 
allocation and safety of the funds in the whole society. Therefore, it has long been 
imperative for China to carry out in-depth banking reform, so as to be better 
adapted to the development of the socialist market economy and in particular to 
meet the urgent needs of all-round opening up of the Chinese financial sector after 
the WTO entry. To this end, the purpose of introducing experienced and qualified 
overseas strategic investors is an effective method to promote as well as enhance 
the reform.123 
 
The willingness, indeed apparent eagerness to bring in strategic bank investors 
was apparently linked in Chinese leadership thinking to making initial public offerings 
(IPOs) in the Hong Kong market of minority interests in state-owned banks.124 Neither 
the interest in strategic investors nor the IPOs were necessarily driven by the need for 
more capital. In a revealing statement, the chairman of SASAC asserted in December 
2005 that IPOs in overseas markets (in which he apparently included Hong Kong) was 
justified because “overseas markets are more regulated and Chinese companies can 
benefit and learn to fine-tune corporate structure and governance.”125 
 
The SCBs, which were carrying out government (and Party) policies in extending 
loans to the SOEs, not only had massive holdings of non-performing loans but also 
tended to earn negative returns on assets. 126  “According to Chinese government 
statistics, as of the end of 2002, China’s four major state-owned commercial banks 
collectively had recorded a bad asset ratio of 25 percent.”127 This figure does not include 
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nonfinancial institutions; state-owned corporations, for example, had NPLs equal to half 
of their total assets as of 1996.128  
 
Although official figures for SCB NPLs more recently began to decline as a 
percentage of assets, the decline was apparently caused in part by a rapid increase in the 
volume of lending (the base for calculating that ratio).129 Moreover, it is likely that NPLs 
would have risen since 2003, not fallen, if it had not been for the infusion of capital from 
the state.130 This infusion continued with the contribution in 2005 of $60 billion in 
capital by the central bank (taken from foreign currency reserves) through the Huijin 
Investment Company, which thereby became a major stockholder of several SCBs.131 A 
Bank of Spain study estimated that total injections of governmental capital into the 
Chinese banking system from 1998 to 2005 was equal to a total of 20 to 25 percent of 
Chinese 2004 GDP, a truly huge subsidy that could easily account for the decline in the 
NPL ratio.132 
 
The Rise of Stock Exchanges and Securities Regulation 
 
 A transformed corporate landscape was thus created by the reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s in which (1) loans by state-owned commercial banks and later by other state-
owned financial institutions replaced capital allocations from the state coupled with (2) 
the conversion of state enterprises into corporations owned by the state—that is, SOEs. 
These two changes soon led to further changes. The reason was that the SOEs were no 
longer able to generate enough profits to fund their own growth, even when coupled with 
bank loans from SCBs. Indeed, additional loans from the SCBs to the SOEs seemed to 
generate steadily increasing portfolios of NPLs for the SCBs.133  
 
  
                                                 
128 Lardy (2003, p. 71).  
129 García Herrero and Santabárbara (2004, p. 22-24); Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (2005a, p. 149). 
130  According Jinglian Wu, Standard and Poor’s reported in September 2003 that even with the 
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131 Browne (2005).  
132 García Herrero et al. (2005). To illustrate the costs to the Chinese government of cleaning up NPLs, a 
proportionately large series of bank bail-outs in the United States would cost between $2 and $3 trillion in 
total. 
133 AQQ (2005b, p. 35, Table 2). As noted earlier in the text, NPLs for SCBs declined later, because 
state bodies, including asset management companies, bought loans in default or otherwise put additional 
funds into SCBs. García Herrera and Santabarbara (2004, p. 15, Table 5). 
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A partial answer to this financing quandary was to create stock exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990, and thereby generate a climate that would induce 
Chinese citizens to use some of their savings to purchase stock of the SOEs in IPOs. It is 
important to stress that one effect, and perhaps a prime purpose, of the move to public 
issuance of securities was to tap private savings to finance the SOEs.134 According to 
Jinglian Wu, a leading Chinese economist who served as an advisor to the State Council, 
the “administrative authorities…adopted the policy that ‘the stock market should serve 
the SOEs.’” Private savings were going to the same ultimate use before through the 
intermediation of state-owned financial institutions, but expansion of that route was 
plagued by the steady rise of NPLs and by the low interest rates paid on savings deposits.  
 
In retrospect, one can see that the creation of the stock exchanges was designed 
not just to support the issuance of stock to the public by providing venues for secondary 
trading but also to stimulate the desire to invest by implicitly promising greater returns to 
savers. What resulted was an enthusiastic search by the public for riches and indeed a 
new kind of gambling for many Chinese citizens; Wu observes that “the government 
boosting the stock market and SOEs grabbing the money” created a “casino without 
rules.”135 Between 1990 and 2001 the Shanghai stock market composite index went up 
approximately twentyfold.136 As the market rose (with price-earnings ratios reaching a 
“ridiculously high level of 100 to 200 in the early 1990s),”137 the amount of money 
raised by the SOEs through IPOs and further stock issuances (seasoned equity offerings) 
increased, reaching 1.7 percent of GDP in 2000. This was almost as high a percentage as 
in the United States during the Internet bubble and a far higher percentage than Japan 
ever reached.138 
 
 The popularity of stock issuance created a new set of Rule of Law problems. The 
SOEs’ demand for new capital continued to grow and with it all kinds of stratagems to 
convince savers to buy what in many cases were financially weak companies. Market 
manipulation139 and even outright fraud became a path for that purpose—“creating fake 
                                                 
134 The “stock market has failed to … improve resource allocation. Rather it provided SOEs with 
unprecedented access to cheap direct finance.” Zhang (2004, p. 2044). See also Green (2004, p. 11) and 
Green (2003, p. 22–24, 26). 
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(2003, p. 165). 
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137 Wu (2005, p. 244). 
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receipts and fake contracts to make up whatever profits that are needed to meet IPO 
requirements.”140 Chen gives the illustration of splitting an SOE into a “good” entity and 
a “bad” entity, selling shares to the public in the good entity but arranging for the bad 
entity to end up with the controlling interest in the now public entity.141 Efforts of 
regulatory authorities to assure that only healthy companies issued stock by imposing 
minimum profit regulations simply led, in Chen’s words, to companies adapting their 
“accounting manipulation schemes” to the new regulations.142 
 
Efforts to commence shareholder securities cases to attack such fraud and 
manipulation was quite a strain for the Chinese judicial system, which had no idea how to 
manage mass tort litigation—that is, how to handle a massive number of individual 
claims against the same defendant for exactly the same alleged wrongdoing. The 
Supreme People’s Court, apparently panicking at the prospect, issued a notice in 2001 
directing lower courts not to accept private securities lawsuits for the time being, despite 
the existence of the underlying 1999 securities act providing supporting substantive legal 
standards.143 But subsequently, in a complex and rapid evolution, rules were worked out 
in consultation with many private sector experts, interpreting the underlying statute and 
creating the basis for actions by shareholders acting jointly.144 However, class actions (in 
which one or more shareholders sue jointly on behalf of shareholders as a class) are 
apparently still not feasible in China.145 Moreover, private class actions require, as a 
predicate, a prior adjudication in favor of the government with respect to the underlying 
violation.146 Nonetheless, the intention of Chinese leaders to empower shareholders is 
reflected in the 2005 company act (effective in 2006) providing explicitly for shareholder 
derivative actions against controlling shareholders and corporate officials violating a 
fiduciary duty.147  
 
As a result of the selling of shares in SOEs to the public and their listing on 
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exchanges, a structure resulted in which an average of about one-third of the shares of an 
SOE (“A shares” for Chinese citizens buying with local currency plus “B shares” for 
foreign currency purchasers) are held by the public with about another one-third held by 
the state (state shares) and the last one-third (legal person shares) held by a variety of 
institutions, in many instances state-related entities including provinces and 
municipalities.148 State shares and legal person shares, unlike shares held by the public, 
are in principle not tradable on exchanges. However, many nontradable shares shares 
have in fact been bought and sold off the exchanges for a variety of reasons.149  
 
At the turn of the millennium Chinese leaders broached their interest in selling 
state shares to the public—a policy known as “reduction of state-owned shares.” In 2001 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued a notice to that effect.150 Although 
the notice was often thought to be a move toward making SOEs true private sector 
enterprises, a more powerful motive may have been to raise still more funds to finance 
SOEs, which were consuming vast amounts of capital in expansion and in covering 
losses. These demands for capital could not be entirely met by SCBs and other state-
owned financial enterprises, which were weighed down with large quantities of NPLs and 
hence were not well placed or strongly motivated to meet these demands. 
 
The news of these intentions coincided with a downturn in the Chinese stock 
market and, while perhaps not causing the downturn, certainly exacerbated it.151 This 
development might not have surprised a more sophisticated financial community. 
Shareholdings (including shares held indirectly through SOEs) by government – state, 
provincial and local – were larger than shareholdings in the hands of the public and 
therefore constituted a huge overhang of potential supply, leading potentially to at least a 
doubling (or if legal person shares were also sold, a tripling) of the number of tradable 
shares outstanding. 152  (At the end of 2002, only 34.7 percent of shares in listed 
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companies were tradable on Chinese stock markets.153) By mid-2005 the Shanghai stock 
exchange index, which once traded above 2200,154 was at a five-year low, trading near 
1000.155 In August 2005 the China Securities Regulatory Commission announced that all 
listed companies’ shares would be made tradable, though at the discretion of the 
companies. However, in order to encourage the change, holders of domestic shares (A 
shares) were promised compensation, thereby discriminating against foreigners who hold 
other classes of shares and against even Chinese who later acquired shares originally 
issued in foreign currency.156 
 
Coexisting with these issues involving SOE shareholdings is an absence of ready 
financing, other than by retained earnings and private savings, for true private sector 
enterprises, despite some informal credit markets. Outstanding corporate domestic 
currency debt securities constitute less than one percent of GDP (in contrast to Malaysia 
at 50 percent, South Korea at 28 percent and emerging markets as a whole at more than 5 
percent).157 As for primary markets in equities, public issuance and listing of non-SOE 
shares (that is, shares of purely private sector companies) are far from the norm: 
 
The chance for nonstate firms becoming listed is extremely slim. Indeed, 
the first public company with a private background did not appear until 
1998, on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.158 
 
According to the Financial Times reporting in 2005, “only between 30 and 130 of the 
1,300 companies listed on the Chinese market have a private-sector background—and 
even some of those are in reality controlled by branches of the state.”159 
 
 Moreover, true private sector firms are only in exceptional cases able to raise 
money by selling shares to the public, but state-owned financial firms may not always 
have the willingness and the ability to lend. Chinese businesses, including SOEs, relied in 
the first quarter of 2005 on banks for 99 percent of their funding, but, according to the 
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Financial Times, “private companies—the motors of growth in the modern Chinese 
economy—borrow money for start-up finance from ‘underground’ banks that charge high 
interest rates.”160 According to one review of the evidence:  
 
There is a wealth of data illustrating the extreme financial constraints 
facing the domestic private firms. A number of international surveys 
shows that [China’s] private firms are more financially constrained than 
private firms in other countries.161  
 
How can one explain, under conditions that so favor the financing of SOEs over 
private companies, the fact that the SOE share of GDP is nevertheless falling, accounting 
in 2002 for only 44 percent of Chinese GPD and only 41 percent of gross industrial 
output?162 One possible answer is that state-owned industry is highly inefficient and 
wasteful of capital. For China as a whole, an important measure of capital efficiency, the 
incremental capital-output ratio (“ICOR”)—which is the ratio of investment (as a 
percentage of GDP) to real economic growth (as a percentage of GDP)—was 5-1; this 
ratio “was comparatively higher than that for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan when they 
were experiencing high economic growth.163 Because of the very high Chinese savings 
rate and the high level of FDI, China is apparently able to waste capital,164 but an 
inefficient and inadequately reformed financial sector could prove to be a barrier to 
continued rapid growth if a crisis, say of the nature of the Asian financial crisis, should 
erupt. 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
 The larger problem created by the existing SOE shareholding structure with the 
state retaining control is not just inefficiency, but the creation of a built-in corporate 
governance problem, leaving the public shareholders locked in the position of minority 
shareholders. The public shareholders are thus vulnerable to expropriation by 
management and/or by state bureaucrats responsible for the firm or the industry in 
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question.165 The risk of such expropriation is heightened by the previously reviewed 
weaknesses of the Chinese judiciary, especially because, as Clarke observes, “Chinese 
courts are not politically powerful and are hence reluctant to take cases involving large 
sums of money and politically powerful defendants.”166 
 
 The abuse by the majority is not just a theoretical possibility. A Report by a task 
force of the Institute of International Finance found, based on data from the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Committee, that “about 75 percent of listed companies have seen 
their IPO proceeds channeled back to the parent company and/or have experienced other 
forms of asset stripping via transfer pricing following the IPO.”167 Individual accounts of 
outright fraud and asset stripping by majority shareholders abound. For example, “the 
1999 annual report of Daqing Liyani Co. revealed that the largest majority shareholder 
stole RMB 620 million Yuan from this corporation, accounting for 50% of its total 
corporate assets.”168 In 2001, “Sanjiu Pharma’s largest shareholder extracted US $301.9 
million, 96% of the listed company’s total equity.”169  
 
 That Chinese leaders recognize the need for corporate governance reform is 
shown by two new regulatory provisions imposed in recent years, one requiring 
independent directors and--as previously mentioned--another imposing a fiduciary duty 
upon directors.170 The real question, of course, is how these requirements are to be given 
specific content and actually enforced in view of the weakness of the Chinese judiciary 
and the elusiveness of the legal concepts involved. In the Chinese context, what does 
independence of directors mean, and what exactly is a fiduciary duty and to whom is it 
owed, where the state owns, directly or indirectly, the majority of the shares, controls 
senior personnel appointments,171 and supports the actions taken? 
 
 SOE managers have learned how to engage in self-dealing even without the 
connivance of state officials, especially through gaining “additional autonomy from their 
supervising agencies” by transactions with private sector companies under their own 
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control or influence: 
 
With the rapid development of the nonstate sector, managers or their 
relatives and friends often have their own businesses, which provides 
opportunities for diverting state assets to private benefits. A large body of 
anecdotal evidence indicates that asset stripping, or siphoning resources 
into structures where the controller has both majority control and income 
rights, is widespread. Furthermore, the “grafting” of nonstate property 
onto the state sector also offers opportunities for asset stripping, for 
instance, by using the appraisal and valuation process to form joint 
ventures….172 
 
Similarly, managers of SOEs having subsidiaries that are listed, and hence having many 
small shareholders, can use their SOE’s control of listed companies to transfer wealth 
through: 
 
soft loans from listed companies on a long-term basis; the use of listed 
companies as guarantors to borrow money from banks; and the sale of 
assets to listed companies at unfair prices, usually without an appraisal by 
an independent evaluator.173 
 
Even bankruptcy has become a convenient occasion for self-dealing by corporate groups: 
a “common practice was to move most of the productive assets to other firms before 
bankruptcy.”174 
 
Credit Markets 
 
 In contrast to capital markets, which play a small role in the Chinese economy 
except for raising capital for SOEs through the sale of shares, credit markets provide the 
great majority of funds for enterprise. In fact, China has the dubious distinction of having 
the largest banking sector relative to GDP of any big economy in the world.175 But the 
credit system has its own weaknesses. Aside from the poor financial condition of the 
banking system, plagued with NPLs, that has required state “bail-out” subsidies of 
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SCBs 176  and the use of asset management companies to take NPLs off the banks’ 
books,177 the credit system has legal problems. 
 
 The core of these problems lies in the uncertainty about secured debt. This 
uncertainty is tied up with the absence of a bankruptcy system appropriate to an economy 
so dependent on a large financial sector. In the early reform years, the very concept of 
bankruptcy was resisted since officials thought it  
 
unfair to punish enterprises that could not make profits because of 
external, “objective” … causes beyond their control (prices, demands of 
planners, fixed assets, etc.) [and] because the burden would fall mostly on 
a few actors (coal, steel, heavy machinery) and the inland provinces where 
these sectors were concentrated.178  
 
Nonetheless, a bankruptcy law for SOEs became effective in 1988 and the 1991 Law of 
Civil Procedure “introduced rudimentary provisions for the bankruptcy of legal 
persons.”179 A more adequate bankruptcy law has been under consideration for some 
years. 180  The biggest stumbling block has apparently been the question of absolute 
priority for secured creditors.181 The principal issue has been the relative priority of 
secured creditors versus employee claims for past wages, pensions, and social welfare 
payments. This issue has had to be addressed in every country, but in China it appears to 
have been a question of ideology favoring workers’ rights versus the needs of the 
economy for putting secured creditors first in priority to assure a steady flow of secured 
credit to key enterprises.182 Another bankruptcy issue has been the uncertain status of 
land pledged as security,183 particularly land that has been “allocated” by administrative 
authorities.184 The new bankruptcy bill has been delayed, apparently due primarily to the 
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employee versus secured creditors priority issue.185 Meanwhile, the great preponderance 
of all credit continues to be provided by advances from state-sector banks, and the 
corporate bond market has remained small.186 
 
Legal and Institutional Reform 
 
 The foregoing review of China’s financial sector points to deep flaws in equity 
and credit markets, and especially in corporate governance. Yet attitudes in the business 
and financial communities abroad toward China’s economic future remain optimistic, 
especially compared to attitudes toward much of the rest of the developing world. Is this 
unjustified euphoria derived from extrapolation of past growth? Or can one find in 
Chinese institutional reform a basis for optimism? 
 
 Certainly China has not pursued the same strategy of reform as the Eurasian 
transition countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Reform in those 
countries tended to involve two strategies, the first to make large and quick changes—at 
the limit, a Big Bang approach of moving from a past of state dominance, state planning, 
and comprehensive price control to a Western-style market economy. The idea, 
particularly for price controls, was to remove them quickly before political opposition 
could arise.187 The second strategy was to adopt the best Western substantive statutes—
world “best practice” legislation. For a number of reasons, notably a failure to improve 
enforcement commensurately and societal resistance to legal transplants, the record in 
those transition countries, notably in the former Soviet Union (aside from the Baltic 
states), was not encouraging. 
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China adopted a different reform strategy. One can characterize it as 
incremental, 188 selectively adaptive, or more perceptive. (Deng Xiaoping called it 
“crossing the river by feeling for stones.”) But it was certainly different and arguably 
more intelligent. Since legal reform was needed to enable economic reform, legal reform 
had to take on some of the same characteristics; Lichtenstein mentions “gradualism, 
experimentation, regional differences” and “piecemeal and sometimes unconnected 
approaches and early vagueness supplemented by later detail.” 189  Most of all, both 
economic and legal reform was evolutionary in character; although Chinese reform was 
more centrally directed and took only a few decades to make a fundamental difference, it 
is reminiscent of the evolutionary developments over centuries in the English legal and 
political system culminating in the Glorious Revolution.190 
 
 Why was China able, or perhaps forced, to carry out a different strategy from the 
Eurasian transition countries? One reason was that, despite some changes in leadership  
after the death of Mao, there was also considerable continuity in leadership. In China 
there was no post-Mao revolution of the type that could permit (despite the relative 
absence of violence) a completely new leadership to assume power as in most of the 
Eurasian transition countries. Thus, the old leadership, below the very top, was still 
partially in power but knew that change was necessary. Yingyi Qian explains one reason 
they did not opt for a big bang transformation: China had had two of them before—the 
Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976—and both 
had ended disastrously. There was no appetite left for messianic transformations.191  
 
 Three of the early reforms illustrate the Chinese reform approach: the dual track, 
the township-village enterprises (TVEs), and fiscal federalism.192 All three involved the 
necessity of taking into account the predictable opposition of established economic 
power centers. As a corollary, the reforms were based on the political recognition that it 
was not feasible to attempt to reform everything at once. (That is, it was hopeless to 
attempt to transition in a few years from a totally socialist society to a market economy.) 
In addition, all three reforms were an intelligent harnessing of a key insight of 
neoinstitutional economics, an insight that is also part of classical microeconomics—the 
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importance of incentives. This explanation is, to be sure, a backward-looking rationale of 
the Chinese reforms. At the beginning, there was no leadership announcement of a 
market economy goal. Even after the market economy goal came into clear sight, 
ideology and politics required the goal to be articulated as a “socialist market economy.” 
In sum, Chinese reforms recognized that the fastest route between two points is not, in a 
political world, necessarily a straight line. Recognition of a goal does not automatically 
make clear the way to achieve the goal, as experienced policymakers throughout the 
world are well aware. 
 
The dual track system. The dual track reform was the path chosen to exit from 
both from state planning (in the mandatory socialist sense) and its concomitant 
comprehensive price control. This control system had powerful proponents: the 
bureaucrats who administered it and the producers that enjoyed a guaranteed margin, 
buying their inputs at designated prices and selling their product at designated prices. 
Both sets of beneficiaries were, in effect, bought off by the dual track system because 
plan quantities remained the same as under past rules and the beneficiaries were able, as 
economists would say, to enjoy the “rents” from this noncompetitive system. But for 
additional production, either by expansion of existing firms or by entry of new firms, the 
rules would be different; with respect to the additional production, firms were allowed to 
buy inputs at whatever price they could, and to sell their outputs at whatever price they 
could. In this instance, and in others, existing firms and political power centers were 
“grandfathered” as part of a consensus decision system.193 
 
The incentives to expand production and to establish new firms were strong. And 
the new inputs and outputs would be traded in what was a market economy. The move 
was economically efficient because it harnessed the economic insight that what counts 
for efficiency is marginal prices, not average prices. GDP in the industrial sector, for 
example, began expanding at double digit rates in 1983 and (except for 1989 and 1990) 
continued at those higher rates.194 The evolutionary character of the dual track is best 
seen in the steel industry. By 1988, with economic expansion being stimulated by the 
market as opposed to the plan, production in the steel industry was far greater than the 
plan quota.195 At the consumer level, retail level transactions at plan prices “declined 
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195 Qian (2003, p. 309, Table 11.3).  
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from 97 percent in 1978 to only 30 percent in 1990” and the decline continued 
thereafter.196 
 
Township-Village Enterprises: TVEs were an adaptation of the Mao period 
commune and brigade enterprises. The leadership used them because they already 
existed, having been “on the fringe of the central planning” system,197 but were renamed 
TVEs, and were harnessed to provide additional production. One way of looking at TVEs 
is to think of them as being a de facto alliance of local government and small collective 
enterprises.198 In the absence of any system of private property, local government would 
have been the prime predator for a local firm to fear (since Beijing was far away199 and 
the central government was in no position to exercise direct power in the country as a 
whole). Putting the local government in business as the owner of the TVEs was a way of 
protecting entrepreneurial firms in the face of insecure and ill-defined property rights.200 
As owners, local governments had a stake in making the TVEs successful because if their 
profits grew, there would be more money available to local government owners for their 
own function—the provision of local public goods. Moreover, these public goods—such 
as law enforcement, public health services, and infrastructure—were beneficial to the 
central government, and hence the center was disinclined to intervene. The TVE reform 
thus worked because of its effect on the incentives of the firm, the local government, and 
the central government. 
 
Over time the TVEs began to compete with each other both in the product market 
and in the market for capital. By 1993 these local government-owned firms were 
providing 27 percent of all industrial output.201 In a further evolution, the government 
began privatizing TVEs, usually by management buy-outs.202 Meanwhile, many TVEs, 
especially older ones in rural areas, are being displaced by private firms,203 and TVEs no 
longer appear to be a favored part of China’s economic reform. 
 
 
                                                 
196 Lau et al. (2000, p. 139, 140, Table 4).  
197 Qian (2003, p. 314). 
198 Chen (2000, p. 7).  
199 A Chinese proverb, “The mountains are high and the Emperor is far away,” thus has a contemporary 
meaning. 
200 McDonnell (2004).  
201 Roland (2000, p. 281).  
202 Laixiang (2005, p.102).Moreover, in the 1990s the growth of TVEs began to give way to the growth 
of private firms. McDonnell (2004, p. 977–982).  
203 Fishman (2005, p. 74–75) and Peerenboom (2002, p. 486). 
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Fiscal Federalism: Reform of intergovernmental fiscal relationships started in 
1980 with a fiscal contracting system that, although varying regionally and evolving over 
time, had the characteristic of a compact between lower and higher levels of government 
within China’s decentralized system. 204  As between provinces and the central 
government, for example, each province divided its tax and other revenue into several 
categories, normally budgetary and extra-budgetary funds. Budgetary funds were to be 
shared between central and provincial governments according to a previously set 
formula.205 A formula might, in the case of provincially raised revenues, for example, 
call for a fixed proportion to be remitted upward—perhaps with an annual adjustment—
and the rest retained by the provincial government. A pre-set formula had the advantage 
that the more revenue a government was able to collect, the more it could devote to its 
own purposes. Extra-budgetary funds, which were derived from such special sources as 
locally owned SOE retained profits, were to be entirely retained by the level of 
government that raised them.  
 
The system, to the extent it worked as planned, provided a strong incentive to 
lower levels of government to maximize its revenues by promoting rather than preying on 
local business since they no longer had as much reason to fear that any increases would 
be taken away by a higher level organ of government.206 Thus, to use the Chinese slogan 
of the time, the center and the local governments were to “eat in separate kitchens.”207 
The segregation of extra-budgetary funds was a particular success in the sense that by the 
early 1990s extra-budgetary revenues had grown to be about equal to budgetary 
revenues. 208  Weingast popularized the notion that Chinese federalism, as a form of 
“market-preserving federalism,” promoted economic growth.209 The fiscal system was, 
however, unstable and had to be revised frequently to make clearer what taxes the central 
government and theprovincial governments would be responsible for. 210  The fiscal 
arrangements illustrate the recurring phenomenon that each stage of reform created its 
                                                 
204  The description of the fiscal contracting system draws heavily on Wu (2005, p. 259-281) and 
Montinola et al. (1995). Details vary from province, Wu (2005, p. 258-263), and no attempt is made here 
to describe the fiscal contracting system in any detail.  
205 The central government also collects revenues, such as tariffs and taxes on enterprises subject to 
central control. Wu (2005, p. 260). 
206 Qian and Weingast (1997). Compare the experience in China with that in Russia where annual 
negotiations were necessary between the provinces and the center. Roland (2000, p. 280).  
207 Shirk (1993, p. 149–178). Sometimes the Chinese slogan is translated as “eating from separate pots.” 
208 Montinola et al. (1995, p. 64).  
209 Weingast (1995). In 1994 the fiscal federalism system was reformed so that the provinces separately 
collected taxes for the central government and for themselves, with the center deciding on forms and rates 
of taxation. Lieberthal (2004, p. 253–254).  
210 Wu (2005, p. 269-290). 
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own perverse incentive and roadblocks, which required adjustments introduced by the 
leadership.211  
 
Guided Evolution? 
 
Much of the economic research on the institutional determinants of economic 
development has wrestled with the econometric problem of showing causation. One of 
the reasons has been that many opponents of the thesis that institutions (and particularly 
legal institutions) have to precede faster economic development have argued that such 
institutions are expensive and only a wealthier society can afford them. The economists’ 
response has been that their econometric studies ran from institutions to development, 
rather than the other way around; in this view, to wait for development to generate the 
wealth necessary for better institutions would simply mean that economic development 
would never occur. 
 
The Chinese experience suggests, however, that an evolutionary approach—let us 
say, a “guided” evolutionary approach—has been the path China’s leaders, beginning 
with Deng Xiaoping, have been following. Thoroughgoing reform, especially of the Big 
Bang type, was not an available option for Deng Xiaoping. He evidently felt that he had 
to feel his way (feeling for stones on the way across the river to development). Political, 
ideological, and especially bureaucratic obstacles had to be overcome, circumvented, or 
sometimes perhaps simply out-waited. Many of the steps taken in the early reform years 
correspond to this interpretation.212 
 
That such a hand-in-hand relationship in the progress of economies and law can 
be found, as John Coffee has documented, in the growth of the U.S. securities markets. 
Those markets developed rapidly in the United States in the nineteenth century without 
the legal structure adequate for deterring fraud and self-dealing (although the New York 
Stock Exchange listing standards constituted a self-regulatory approach to investor 
protection). But it was not until after the 1929 crash that the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were enacted, creating the legal structure for today’s 
U.S. securities markets.213 Coffee, reviewing the U.S. experience and a comparable U.K. 
                                                 
211 Wu (2005, p. 282-290). 
212 For an excellent review of early Chinese reform consistent with this interpretation, see Shirk (1993). 
See also Baum (1994, p. 15–18) for a critical view of the Deng Xiaoping reform approach, noting that 
“some of Deng’s stepping stones became millstones.”  
213 Coffee (2001).  
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experience, observes that the political constituency necessary for the legal reforms was 
not in place earlier but was created by financial developments that they were enacted to 
support and safeguard the expansion of already existing markets: 
 
Although there is little evidence that strong legal rules encouraged the 
development of either the New York or London Stock Exchanges …, the 
reverse does seem to be true: Strong markets do create a demand for 
stronger legal rules. Both in the United States and the United Kingdom, as 
liquid securities markets developed and dispersed ownership became 
prevalent, a new political constituency developed that desired legal rules 
capable of filling in the inevitable enforcement gaps that self-regulation 
left.214 
 
 This is a comforting notion and does seem to describe how Chinese leaders 
unleashed rapid growth in the post-Mao period, filling in the chinks and gaps in the legal 
infrastructure to support further development as they went forward. In fact, unlike 
Coffee’s securities markets example, the Chinese experience seems to be less purely 
reactive to scandal than the U.S. depression-period legislative reform. Chinese reform 
seems to be more thought out and even guided by the leadership of the CCP.215  
 
However, although this kind of “feeling for stones” evolution put China on the 
path to rapid economic development, the momentum of reform appears to have slowed 
over the last decade, at least in the financial sector. Stock exchanges were well accepted 
when they helped finance SOEs, but the SOEs themselves seem to have resisted further 
reform.216 (However, SOEs have been able to “downsize” by shedding almost 40 percent 
of employees between 1998 and 2003. 217 ) The shareholding structure of SOEs has 
seriously delayed further securities market expansion and has discouraged investors (if 
one is to judge by market averages). Political and ideological barriers can apparently be 
managed by the Chinese leadership, but not always and not indefinitely. 
 
 
                                                 
214 Id. at 80. 
215 Shirk (2003, p. 123–124) makes the point that reform was slowed down when the CCP leadership 
was divided or at least perceived as divided by the bureaucracy.  
216 One chronicle of Chinese reform calls SOE reform a “miserable failure.” Qian (2003, p. 306).  
217 “From 1996 to 2001, 53 million people working in China’s state sector lost their jobs. That is 7 
million more people than the total employment rolls of 46 of the five hundred largest corporations in the 
world. Or, to state the numbers another way: in the four years beginning in 1998, state-owned companies 
fired 21 million. That’s more than all the Americans who work in manufacturing.” Fishman (2005, p. 74).  
According to other data, employment in the state controlled industrial sector fell by 40 percent from 1998 
to 2002. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005a, p. 95). 
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Still, it is noteworthy that each generation of Chinese leaders appears increasingly 
comfortable with the notions that market influences should determine the direction of the 
economy, that the Rule of Law deserves at least verbal support as an objective, and that 
incentives play a crucial role in economic growth. A key problem faced by the current 
Chinese leadership is created in large measure by recent Chinese political, economic, and 
ideological history, which has left the leadership to face a multitude of stumbling blocks, 
ranging from underperforming state-owned industrial and financial enterprises to state 
bureaucracies and local governments that enjoy de facto autonomy in many spheres and 
that therefore have strong incentives to resist change. 
 
The fact that Chinese leaders and thinkers have expressed an interest in Douglass 
North and his work suggests that they know that their institutions are not sufficiently 
strong for indefinite sustained growth.218 The Chinese have no doubt been wise to avoid 
a legal transplantation strategy (transplanting advanced country law) in view of the 
distinctive social norms and culture that China’s long history, its relative isolation from 
outside influences, and its internal twentieth century upheavals have produced. But 
evolution has its limits too. Evolution toward the Rule of Law in Western Europe, 
including England, took centuries. In China the evolution is more controlled from the 
center than anyone could claim about the earlier evolution in Europe. 
 
In a book edited by Dani Rodrik that was devoted to a review of the economic 
growth history of a number of developing countries, Rodrik drew the following two 
overall conclusions. First: “The onset of economic growth does not require deep and 
extensive institutional reform.”219 China certainly presents powerful evidence in support 
of that conclusion. But Rodrik’s second conclusion raises squarely the China case: 
“Sustaining high growth in the face of adverse circumstances requires ever stronger 
institutions.”220 This is a principle that the Chinese leadership seems to understand. What 
we do not yet know is whether they will be able to continue to implement the institutional 
reforms implied in that principle. 
 
That is why it is crucial to understand that China is still a poor country, well 
                                                 
218 In his Internet autobiography Douglass North points to the fact that after his Nobel Prize, he had been 
asked to elaborate his views, “particularly in China, where there is much enthusiasm about the implications 
of the new institutional economics applied to solving problems of the Chinese political economic future.” 
See Douglass C. North—Autobiography. Available at  
[http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1993/north-autobio.html]. 
219 Rodrik (2003, p. 15) 
220 Rodrik (2003, p. 16) 
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below the per capita income of the Asian (former) Tigers when their growth slowdown 
began. As the Asian Crisis illustrated, China still is short of the point where the Asian 
Crisis type of challenges will have to be addressed, recognizing that the Asian Crisis was 
as much an institutional as a macroeconomic crisis. In China the present difficulties and 
dilemmas in the financial sector illustrate the complexities resulting from earlier 
compromises and half measures. And the leadership’s inability thus far in the strictly 
legal arena to overcome such challenges as local protectionism and lack of judicial 
independence illustrates the heights still to be scaled. 
 
All of these circumstances recall Zhou Enlai’s famous answer to a question about 
the consequences of the French Revolution, “It is too early to tell.” It is certainly too 
early to accept the notion that recent Chinese experience is a counterexample to the need 
for a focus on institutions in the developing world and, indeed, for a Rule of Law in 
China itself. While we will not know for certain for several decades exactly what 
conclusion to draw, we can still say with considerable confidence that there is little thus 
far in the Chinese experience to lead to the conclusion that Rule of Law issues are not 
important in economic development.  
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